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We study repeated games where players use an exponential learn-
ing scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the
game’s payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads
to a new stochastic version of the replicator dynamics that is quite
different from the “aggregate shocks” approach of evolutionary game
theory. Irrespective of the perturbations’ magnitude, we find that
strategies which are dominated (even iteratively) eventually become
extinct and that the game’s strict Nash equilibria are stochastically
asymptotically stable. We complement our analysis by illustrating
these results in the case of congestion games.
1. Introduction. Ever since it was introduced in [19], the notion of a
Nash equilibrium and its refinements have remained among the most promi-
nent solution concepts of noncooperative game theory. In its turn, not only
has noncooperative game theory found applications in such diverse topics as
economics, biology and network design, but it has also become the standard
language to actually describe complex agent interactions in these fields.
Still, the issue of why and how players may arrive to equilibrial strate-
gies in the first place remains an actively debated question. After all, the
complexity of most games increases exponentially with the number of play-
ers and, hence, identifying a game’s equilibria quickly becomes prohibitively
difficult. Accordingly, as was first pointed out by Aumann in [3], a player
has no incentive to play his component of a Nash equilibrium unless he is
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convinced that all other players will play theirs. And if the game in question
has multiple Nash equilibria, this argument gains additional momentum: in
that case, even players with unbounded deductive capabilities will be hard-
pressed to choose a strategy.
From this point of view, rational individuals would appear to be more
in tune with Aumann’s notion of a correlated equilibrium where subjective
beliefs are also taken into account [3]. Nevertheless, the seminal work of
Maynard Smith on animal conflicts [15] has cast Nash equilibria in a dif-
ferent light because it unearthed a profound connection between evolution
and rationality: roughly speaking, one leads to the other. So, when different
species contend for the limited resources of their habitat, evolution and nat-
ural selection steer the ensuing conflict to an equilibrial state which leaves no
room for irrational behavior. As a consequence, instinctive “fight or flight”
responses that are deeply ingrained in a species can be seen as a form of
rational behavior, acquired over the species’ evolutionary course.
Of course, this evolutionary approach concerns large populations of dif-
ferent species which are rarely encountered outside the realm of population
biology. However, the situation is not much different in the case of a finite
number of players who try to learn the game by playing again and again and
who strive to do better with the help of some learning algorithm. Therein,
evolution does not occur as part of a birth/death process; rather, it is a
byproduct of the players’ acquired experience in playing the game—see [6]
for a most comprehensive account.
It is also worth keeping in the back of our mind that in some applications
of game theory, “rationality” requirements precede evolution. For example,
recent applications to network design start from a set of performance aspira-
tions (such as robustness and efficiency) that the players (network devices)
seek to attain in the network’s equilibrial state. Thus, to meet these re-
quirements, one has to literally reverse-engineer the process by finding the
appropriate game whose equilibria will satisfy the players—the parallel with
mechanism design being obvious.
In all these approaches, a fundamental selection mechanism is that of the
replicator dynamics put forth in [23] and [22] which reinforces a strategy
proportionately to the difference of its payoff from the mean (taken over the
species or the player’s strategies, depending on the approach). As was shown
in the multi-population setting of Samuelson and Zhang [21] (which is closer
to learning than the self-interacting single-population scenaria of [23] and
[22]), these dynamics are particularly conducive to rationality. Strategies
that are suboptimal when paired against any choice of one’s adversaries
rapidly become extinct, and in the long run, only rationally admissible
strategies can survive. Even more to the point, the only attracting states
of the dynamics turn out to be precisely the (strict) Nash equilibria of the
game—see [11] for a masterful survey.
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We thus see that Nash equilibria arise over time as natural attractors for
rational individuals, a fact which further justifies their prominence among
noncooperative solution concepts. Yet, this behavior is also conditional on
the underlying game remaining stationary throughout the time horizon that
it takes players to adapt to it—and unfortunately, this stationarity assump-
tion is rarely met in practical applications. In biological models, for exam-
ple, the reproductive fitness of an individual may be affected by the ever-
changing weather conditions; in networks, communication channels carry
time-dependent noise and interference as well as signals; and when players
try to sample their strategies, they might have to deal with erroneous or
imprecise readings.
It is thus logical to ask: does rational behavior still emerge in the presence
of stochastic perturbations that interfere with the underlying game?
In evolutionary games, these perturbations traditionally take the form
of “aggregate shocks” that are applied directly to the population of each
phenotype. This approach by Fudenberg and Harris [5] has spurred quite a
bit of interest and there is a number of features that differentiate it from
the deterministic one. For example, Cabrales showed in [4] that dominated
strategies indeed become extinct, but only if the variance of the shocks is
low enough. More recently, the work of Imhof and Hofbauer [8, 10] revealed
that even equilibrial play arises over time but again, conditionally on the
variance of the shocks.
Be that as it may, if one looks at games with a finite number of players,
it is hardly relevant to consider shocks of this type because there are no
longer any populations to apply them to. Instead, the stochastic fluctuations
should be reflected directly on the stimuli that incite players to change their
strategies: their payoffs. This leads to a picture which is very different from
the evolutionary one and is precisely the approach that we will be taking.
Outline of results. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of players in
stochastically perturbed games of this sort. The particular stimulus-response
model that we consider is simple enough: players keep cumulative scores of
their strategies’ performance and employ exponentially more often the one
that scores better. After a few preliminaries in Section 2, this approach is
made precise in Section 3 where we derive the stochastic replicator equation
that governs the behavior of players when their learning curves are subject
to random perturbations.
The replicator equation that we get is different from the “aggregate shocks”
approach of [4, 5, 8, 10] and, as a result, it exhibits markedly different ratio-
nality properties as well. In stark contrast to the results of [4, 10], we show in
Section 4 that dominated strategies become extinct irrespective of the noise
level (Proposition 4.1) and provide an exponential bound for the rate of de-
cay of these strategies (Proposition 4.2). In fact, by induction on the rounds
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of elimination of dominated strategies, we show that this is true even for it-
eratively dominated strategies: despite the noise, only rationally admissible
strategies can survive in the long run (Theorem 4.3). Then, as an easy corol-
lary of the above, we infer that players will converge to a strict equilibrium
(Corollary 4.4) whenever the underlying game is dominance-solvable.
We continue with the issue of equilibrial play in Section 5 by making a
suggestive detour in the land of congestion games. If the noise is relatively
mild with respect to the rate with which players learn, we find that the
game’s potential is a Lyapunov function which ensures that strict equilibria
are stochastically attracting; and if the game is dyadic (i.e., players only
have two choices), this tameness assumption can be dropped altogether.
Encouraged by the results of Section 5, we attack the general case in Sec-
tion 6. As it turns out, strict equilibria are always asymptotically stochasti-
cally stable in the perturbed replicator dynamics that stem from exponential
learning (Theorem 6.1). This begs to be compared to the results of [8, 10]
where it is the equilibria of a suitably modified game that are stable, and
not necessarily those of the actual game being played. Fortunately, expo-
nential learning seems to give players a clearer picture of the original game
and there is no need for similar modifications in our case.
Notational conventions. Given a finite set S = {s0, . . . , sn}, we will rou-
tinely identify the set ∆(S) of probability measures on S with the standard
n-dimensional simplex of Rn+1 :∆(S)≡ {x ∈Rn+1 :∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}.
Under this identification, we will also make no distinction between sα ∈ S
and the vertex eα of ∆(S); in fact, to avoid an overcluttering of indices,
we will frequently use α to refer to either sα or eα, writing, for example,
“α ∈ S” or “u(α)” instead of “sα ∈ S” or “u(eα),” respectively.
To streamline our presentation, we will consistently employ Latin indices
for players (i, j, k, . . .) and Greek for their strategies (α,β,µ, . . .), separating
the two by a comma when it would have been æsthetically unpleasant not
to. In like manner, when we have to discriminate between strategies, we
will assume that indices from the first half of the Greek alphabet start
at 0 (α,β = 0,1,2, . . .) while those taken from the second half start at 1
(µ, ν = 1,2, . . .).
Finally, if X(t) is some stochastic process in Rn starting at X(0) = x, its
law will be denoted by PX;x or simply by Px if there is no danger of confusion;
and if the context leaves no doubt as to which process we are referring to,
we will employ the term “almost surely” in place of the somewhat unwieldy
“Px-almost surely.”
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2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Basic facts and definitions from game theory. As is customary, our
starting point will be a (finite) set of N players, indexed by i ∈N = {1, . . . ,N}.
The players’ possible actions are drawn from their strategy sets Si = {siα :α=
0, . . . , Si−1} and they can combine them by choosing their αith (pure) strat-
egy with probability piαi . In that case, the players’ mixed strategies will be
described by the points pi = (pi,0, pi,1, . . .) ∈∆i := ∆(Si) or, more succinctly,
by the strategy profile p= (p1, . . . , pN) ∈∆ :=
∏
i∆i.
In particular, if eiα denotes the αth vertex of the ith component sim-
plex ∆i →֒∆, the (pure) profile q = (e1,α1 , . . . , eN,αN ) simply corresponds
to player i playing αi ∈ Si. On the other hand, if we wish to focus on the
strategy of a particular player i ∈ N against that of his opponents N−i :=
N \ {i}, we will employ the shorthand notation (p−i; qi) = (p1 · · · qi · · ·pN )
to denote the profile where i plays qi ∈∆i against his opponents’ strategy
p−i ∈∆−i :=
∏
j 6=i∆j .
So, once players have made their strategic choices, let ui,α1,...,αN be the
reward of player i in the profile (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ S =
∏
i Si, that is, the payoff
that strategy αi ∈ Si yields to player i against the strategy α−i ∈ S−i =∏
j 6=iSj of i’s opponents. Then, if players mix their strategies, their expected
reward will be given by the (multilinear) payoff functions ui :∆→R:
ui(p) =
∑
α1∈S1
· · ·
∑
αN∈SN
ui,α1···αN p1,α1 · · ·pN,αN .(2.1)
Under this light, the payoff that a player receives when playing a pure strat-
egy α ∈ Si deserves special mention and will be denoted by
uiα(p) := ui(p−i;α)≡ ui(p1 · · ·α · · ·pN ).(2.2)
This collection of players i ∈N , their strategies αi ∈ Si and their payoffs
ui will be our working definition for a game in normal form, usually denoted
by G—or G(N ,S, u) if we need to keep track of more data.
Needless to say, rational players who seek to maximize their individual
payoffs will avoid strategies that always lead to diminished payoffs against
any play of their opponents. We will thus say that the strategy qi ∈∆i is
(strictly) dominated by q′i ∈∆i and we will write qi ≺ q′i when
ui(p−i; qi)< ui(p−i; q
′
i)(2.3)
for all strategies p−i ∈∆−i of i’s opponents N−i.
With this in mind, dominated strategies can be effectively removed from
the analysis of a game because rational players will have no incentive to ever
use them. However, by deleting such a strategy, another strategy (perhaps of
another player) might become dominated and further deletions of iteratively
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dominated strategies might be in order (see Section 4 for more details).
Proceeding ad infinitum, we will say that a strategy is rationally admissible
if it survives every round of elimination of dominated strategies. If the set
of rationally admissible strategies is a singleton (e.g., as in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma), the game will be called dominance-solvable and the sole surviving
strategy will be the game’s rational solution.
Then again, not all games can be solved in this way and it is natural
to look for strategies which are stable at least under unilateral deviations.
Hence, we will say that a strategy profile p ∈∆ is a Nash equilibrium of the
game G when
ui(p)≥ ui(p−i; q) for all q ∈∆i, i ∈N .(2.4)
If the equilibrium profile p only contains pure strategies αi ∈ Si, we will
refer to it as a pure equilibrium; and if the inequality (2.4) is strict for all
q 6= pi ∈∆i, i ∈N , the equilibrium p will carry instead the characterization
strict.
Clearly, if two pure strategies α,β ∈ Si are present with positive probabil-
ity in an equilibrial strategy pi ∈∆i, then we must have uiα(p) = uiβ(p) as
a result of ui being linear in pi. Consequently, only pure profiles can satisfy
the strict version of (2.4) so that strict equilibria must also be pure. The
converse implication is false but only barely so: a pure equilibrium fails to
be strict only if a player has more than one pure strategies that return the
same rewards. Since this is almost always true (in the sense that the degen-
erate case can be resolved by an arbitrarily small perturbation of the payoff
functions), we will relax our terminology somewhat and use the two terms
interchangeably.
To recover the connection of equilibrial play with strategic dominance,
note that if a game is solvable by iterated elimination of dominated strate-
gies, the single rationally admissible strategy that survives will be the game’s
unique strict equilibrium. But the significance of strict equilibria is not ex-
hausted here: strict equilibria are exactly the evolutionarily stable strategies
of multi-population evolutionary games—Proposition 5.1 in [11]. Moreover,
as we shall see a bit later, they are the only asymptotically stable states of
the multi-population replicator dynamics—again, see Chapter 5, pages 216
and 217 of [11].
Unfortunately, strict equilibria do not always exist, Rock-Paper-Scissors
being the typical counterexample. Nevertheless, pure equilibria do exist
in many large and interesting classes of games, even when we leave out
dominance-solvable ones. Perhaps the most noteworthy such class is that of
congestion games.
Definition 2.1. A game G ≡ G(N ,S, u) will be called a congestion
game when:
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1. all players i ∈N share a common set of facilities F as their strategy set:
Si =F for all i ∈N ;
2. the payoffs are functions of the number of players sharing a particular
facility: ui,α1···α···αN ≡ uα(Nα) whereNα is the number of players choosing
the same facility as i.
Amazingly enough, Monderer and Shapley made the remarkable discovery
in [18] that these games are actually equivalent to the class of potential
games.
Definition 2.2. A game G≡G(N ,S, u) will be called a potential game
if there exists a function V :∆→R such that
ui(p−i; qi)− ui(p−i; q′i) =−(V (p−i; qi)− V (p−i; q′i))(2.5)
for all players i ∈N and all strategies p−i ∈∆−i, qi, q′i ∈∆i.
This equivalence reveals that both classes of games possess equilibria in
pure strategies: it suffices to look at the vertices of the face of ∆ where the
(necessarily multilinear) potential function V is minimized.
2.2. Learning, evolution and the replicator dynamics. As one would ex-
pect, locating the Nash equilibria of a game is a rather complicated problem
that requires a great deal of global calculations, even in the case of potential
games (where it reduces to minimizing a multilinear function over a con-
vex polytope). Consequently, it is of interest to see whether there are simple
and distributed learning schemes that allow players to arrive at a reasonably
stable solution.
One such scheme is based on an exponential learning behavior where
players play the game repeatedly and keep records of their strategies’ per-
formance. In more detail, at each instance of the game all players i ∈ N
update the cumulative scores Uiα of their strategies α ∈ Si as specified by
the recursive formula
Uiα(t+ 1) = Uiα(t) + uiα(p(t)),(2.6)
where p(t) ∈ ∆ is the players’ strategy profile at the tth iteration of the
game and, in the absence of initial bias, we assume that Uiα(0) = 0 for all
i ∈N , α ∈ Si. These scores reinforce the perceived success of each strategy as
measured by the average payoff it yields and hence, it stands to reason that
players will lean towards the strategy with the highest score. The precise way
in which they do that is by playing according to the namesake exponential
law:
piα(t+1) =
eUiα(t+1)∑
β∈Si
eUiβ(t+1)
.(2.7)
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For simplicity, we will only consider the case where players update their
scores in continuous time, that is, according to the coupled equations
dUiα(t) = uiα(x(t))dt,(2.8a)
xiα(t) =
eUiα(t)∑
β e
Uiβ(t)
.(2.8b)
Then, if we differentiate (2.8b) to decouple it from (2.8a), we obtain the
standard (multi-population) replicator dynamics
dxiα
dt
= xiα
(
uiα(x)−
∑
β
xiβuiβ(x)
)
= xiα(uiα(x)− ui(x)).(2.9)
Alternatively, if players learn at different speeds as a result of varied
stimulus-response characteristics, their updating will take the form
xiα(t) =
eλiUiα(t)∑
β e
λiUiβ(t)
,(2.10)
where λi represents the learning rate of player i, that is, the “weight” which
he assigns to his perceived scores Uiα. In this way, the replicator equation
evolves at a different time scale for each player, leading to the rate-adjusted
dynamics
dxiα
dt
= λixiα(uiα(x)− ui(x)).(2.11)
Naturally, the uniform dynamics (2.9) are recovered when all players learn
at the “standard” rate λi = 1.
If we view the exponential learning model (2.7) from a stimulus-response
angle, we see that that the payoff of a strategy simply represents an (expo-
nential) propensity of employing said strategy. It is thus closely related to
the algorithm of logistic fictitious play [6] where the strategy xi of (2.10)
can be seen as the (unique) best reply to the profile x−i in some suitably
modified payoffs vi(x) = ui(x)+
1
λi
H(xi). Interestingly enough, H(xi) turns
out to be none other than the entropy of xi:
H(xi) =−
∑
β : xiβ>0
xiβ logxiβ.(2.12)
That being so, we deduce that the learning rates λi act the part of (player-
specific) inverse temperatures: in high temperatures (small λi), the players’
learning curves are “soft” and the payoff differences between strategies are
toned down; on the contrary, if λi →∞ the scheme “freezes” to a myopic
best-reply process.
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The replicator dynamics were first derived in [23] in the context of pop-
ulation biology, first for different phenotypes within a single species (single-
population models), and then for different species altogether (multi-population
models; [9] and [11] provide excellent surveys). In both these cases, one be-
gins with large populations of individuals that are programmed to a particu-
lar behavior (e.g., fight for “hawks” or flight for “doves”) and matches them
randomly in a game whose payoffs directly affect the reproductive fitness of
the individual players.
More precisely, let ziα(t) be the population size of the phenotype (strat-
egy) α ∈ Si of species (player) i ∈N in some multi-population model where
individuals are matched to play a game G with payoff functions ui. Then,
the relative frequency (share) of α will be specified by the population state
x= (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈∆ where xiα = ziα/
∑
β ziβ . So, if N individuals are drawn
randomly from the N species, their expected payoffs will be given by ui(x),
i ∈N , and if these payoffs represent a proportionate increase in the pheno-
type’s fitness (measured as the number of offsprings in the unit of time), we
will have
dziα(t) = ziα(t)uiα(x(t))dt.(2.13)
As a result, the population state x(t) will evolve according to
dxiα
dt
=
1∑
β ziβ
dziα
dt
−
∑
γ
xiα∑
β ziβ
dziγ
dt
= xiα(uiα(x)− ui(x)),(2.14)
which is exactly (2.9) viewed from an evolutionary perspective.
On the other hand, we should note here that in single-population mod-
els the resulting equation is cubic and not quadratic because strategies are
matched against themselves. To wit, assume that individuals are randomly
drawn from a large population and are matched against one another in a
(symmetric) 2-player game G with strategy space S = {1, . . . , S} and payoff
matrix u = {uαβ}. Then, if xα denotes the population share of individu-
als that are programmed to the strategy α ∈ S , their expected payoff in
a random match will be given by uα(x) :=
∑
β uαβxβ ≡ u(α,x); similarly,
the population average payoff will be u(x,x) =
∑
α xαuα(x). Hence, by fol-
lowing the same procedure as above, we end up with the single-population
replicator dynamics
dxα
dt
= xα(uα(x)− u(x,x)),(2.15)
which behave quite differently than their multi-population counterpart (2.14).
As far as rational behavior is concerned, the replicator dynamics have
some far-reaching ramifications. If we focus on multi-population models,
Samuelson and Zhang showed in [21] that the share xiα(t) of a strategy
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α ∈ Si which is strictly dominated (even iteratively) converges to zero along
any interior solution path of (2.9); in other words, dominated strategies be-
come extinct in the long run. Additionally, there is a remarkable equivalence
between the game’s Nash equilibria and the stationary points of the repli-
cator dynamics: the asymptotically stable states of (2.9) coincide precisely
with the strict Nash equilibria of the underlying game [11].
2.3. Elements of stability analysis. A large part of our work will be fo-
cused on examining whether the rationality properties of exponential learn-
ing (elimination of dominated strategies and asymptotic stability of strict
equilibria) remain true in a stochastic setting. However, since asymptotic
stability is (usually) too stringent an expectation for stochastic dynamical
systems, we must instead consider its stochastic analogue.
That being the case, let W (t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wn(t)) be a standard Wiener
process in Rn and consider the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXα(t) = bα(X(t))dt+
∑
β
σαβ(X(t))dWβ(t).(2.16)
Following [1, 7], the notion of asymptotic stability in this SDE is expressed
by the following.
Definition 2.3. We will say that q ∈Rn is stochastically asymptotically
stable when, for every neighborhood U of q and every ε > 0, there exists a
neighborhood V of q such that
Px
{
X(t) ∈ U for all t≥ 0, lim
t→∞
X(t) = q
}
≥ 1− ε(2.17)
for all initial conditions X(0) = x ∈ V of the SDE (2.16).
Much the same as in the deterministic case, stochastic asymptotic stability
is often established by means of a Lyapunov function. In our context, this
notion hinges on the second order differential operator that is associated to
(2.16), namely the generator L of X(t):
L=
n∑
α=1
bα(x)
∂
∂xα
+
1
2
n∑
α,β=1
(σ(x)σT (x))αβ
∂2
∂xα ∂xβ
.(2.18)
The importance of this operator can be easily surmised from Itoˆ’s lemma;
indeed, if f :Rn→R is sufficiently smooth, the generator L simply captures
the drift of the process Y (t) = f(X(t)):
dY (t) = Lf(X(t))dt+
∑
α,β
∂f
∂xα
∣∣∣∣
X(t)
σαβ(X(t))dWβ(t).(2.19)
In this way, L can be seen as the stochastic version of the time derivative
d
dt
; this analogy then leads to the following.
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Definition 2.4. Let q ∈ Rn and let U be an open neighborhood of q.
We will say that f is a (local) stochastic Lyapunov function for the SDE
(2.16) if:
1. f(x)≥ 0 for all x ∈U , with equality iff x= q;
2. there exists a constant k > 0 such that Lf(x)≤−kf(x) for all x ∈ U .
Whenever such a Lyapunov function exists, it is known that the point
q ∈ Rn where f attains its minimum will be stochastically asymptotically
stable—for example, see Theorem 4 in pages 314 and 315 of [7].
A final point that should be mentioned here is that our analysis will be
constrained on the compact polytope ∆=
∏
i∆i instead of all of
∏
iR
Si . Ac-
cordingly, the “neighborhoods” of Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 should be taken to
mean “neighborhoods in ∆,” that is, neighborhoods in the subspace topology
of ∆ →֒∏iRSi . This minor point should always be clear from the context
and will only be raised in cases of ambiguity.
3. Learning in the presence of noise. Of course, it could be argued that
the rationality properties of the exponential learning scheme are a direct
consequence of the players’ receiving accurate information about the game
when they update their scores. However, this is a requirement that cannot
always be met: the interference of nature in the game or imperfect readings
of one’s utility invariably introduce fluctuations in (2.8a), and in their turn,
these lead to a perturbed version of the replicator dynamics (2.9).
To account for these random perturbations, we will assume that the play-
ers’ scores are now governed instead by the stochastic differential equation
dUiα(t) = uiα(X(t))dt+ ηiα(X(t))dWiα(t),(3.1)
where, as before, the strategy profile X(t) ∈∆ is given by the logistic law
Xiα(t) =
eUiα(t)∑
β e
Uiβ(t)
.(3.2)
In this last equation, W (t) is a standard Wiener process living in
∏
iR
Si and
the coefficients ηiα measure the impact of the noise on the players’ scoring
systems. Of course, these coefficients need not be constant: after all, the
effect of the noise on the payoffs might depend on the state of the game
in some typically continuous way. For this reason, we will assume that the
functions ηiα are continuous on ∆, and we will only note en passant that our
results still hold for essentially bounded coefficients ηiα (we will only need to
replace min and max with ess inf and ess sup, respectively, in all expressions
involving ηiα).
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A very important instance of this dependence can be seen if ηiα(x−i;α) = 0
for all i ∈N , α ∈ Si, x−i ∈∆−i, in which case equation (3.1) becomes a con-
vincing model for the case of insufficient information. It states that when a
player actually uses a strategy, his payoff observations are accurate enough;
but with regards to strategies he rarely employs, his readings could be ar-
bitrarily off the mark.
Now, to decouple (3.1) and (3.2), we may simply apply Itoˆ’s lemma to
the process X(t). To that end, recall thatW (t) has independent components
across players and strategies, so that dWjβ ·dWkγ = δjkδβγ dt (the Kronecker
symbols δβγ being 0 for β 6= γ and 1, otherwise). Then, Itoˆ’s formula gives
dXiα =
∑
j
∑
β
∂Xiα
∂Ujβ
dUjβ
+
1
2
∑
j,k
∑
β,γ
∂2Xiα
∂Ujβ ∂Ukγ
dUjβ · dUkγ
(3.3)
=
∑
β
(
uiβ(X)
∂Xiα
∂Uiβ
+
1
2
η2iβ(X)
∂2Xiα
∂U2iβ
)
dt
+
∑
β
ηiβ(X)
∂Xiα
∂Uiβ
dWiβ .
On the other hand, a simple differentiation of (3.2) yields
∂Xiα
∂Uiβ
=Xiα(δαβ −Xiβ),(3.4a)
∂2Xiα
∂U2iβ
=Xiα(δαβ −Xiβ)(1− 2Xiβ)(3.4b)
and by plugging these expressions back into (3.3), we get
dXiα =Xiα[uiα(X)− ui(X)]dt
+Xiα
[
1
2
η2iα(X)(1− 2Xiα)−
1
2
∑
β
η2iβ(X)Xiβ(1− 2Xiβ)
]
dt(3.5)
+Xiα
[
ηiα(X)dWiα −
∑
β
ηiβ(X)Xiβ dWiβ
]
.
Alternatively, if players update their strategies with different learning rates
λi, we should instead apply Itoˆ’s formula to (2.10). In so doing, we obtain
dXiα = λiXiα[uiα(X)− ui(X)]dt
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+
λ2i
2
Xiα
[
η2iα(X)(1− 2Xiα)−
∑
β
η2iβ(X)Xiβ(1− 2Xiβ)
]
dt
(3.5′)
+ λiXiα
[
ηiα(X)dWiα −
∑
ηiβ(X)Xiβ dWiβ
]
= biα(X)dt+
∑
β
σi,αβ(X)dWiβ ,
where, in obvious notation, biα(x) and σi,αβ(x) are, respectively, the drift and
diffusion coefficients of the diffusionX(t). Obviously, when λi = 1, we recover
the uniform dynamics (3.5); equivalently (and this is an interpretation that
is well worth keeping in mind), the rates λi can simply be regarded as a
commensurate inflation of the payoffs and noise coefficients of player i ∈N
in the uniform logistic model (3.2).
Equation (3.5) and its rate-adjusted sibling (3.5′) will constitute our
stochastic version of the replicator dynamics and thus merit some discus-
sion in and by themselves. First, note that these dynamics admit a (unique)
strong solution for any initial state X(0) = x ∈∆, even though they do not
satisfy the linear growth condition |b(x)|+ |σ(x)| ≤C(1+ |x|) that is required
for the existence and uniqueness theorem for SDEs (e.g., Theorem 5.2.1 in
[20]). Instead, an addition over α ∈ Si reveals that every simplex ∆i ⊆ ∆
remains invariant under (3.5): if Xi(0) = xi ∈∆i, then d(
∑
αXiα) = 0 and
hence, Xi(t) will stay in ∆i for all t ≥ 0—actually, it is not harder to see
that every face of ∆ is a trap for X(t).
So, if φ is a smooth bump function that is equal to 1 on some open
neighborhood of U ⊇∆ and which vanishes outside some compact set K ⊇
U , the SDE
dXiα = φ(X)
(
biα(X)dt+
∑
β
σi,αβ(X)dWiβ
)
(3.6)
will have bounded diffusion and drift coefficients and will thus admit a
unique strong solution. But since this last equation agrees with (3.5) on ∆
and any solution of (3.5) always stays in ∆, we can easily conclude that our
perturbed replicator dynamics admit a unique strong solution for any initial
X(0) = x∈∆.
It is also important to compare the dynamics (3.5), (3.5′) to the “ag-
gregate shocks” approach of Fudenberg and Harris [5] that has become the
principal incarnation of the replicator dynamics in a stochastic environment.
So, let us first recall how aggregate shocks enter the replicator dynamics in
the first place. The main idea is that the reproductive fitness of an individual
is not only affected by deterministic factors but is also subject to stochastic
shocks due to the “weather” and the interference of nature with the game.
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More precisely, if Ziα(t) denotes the population size of phenotype α ∈ Si of
the species i ∈N in some multi-population evolutionary game G, its growth
will be determined by
dZiα(t) = Ziα(t)(uiα(X(t))dt+ ηiα dWiα(t)),(3.7)
where, as in (2.13),X(t) ∈∆ denotes the population sharesXiα = Ziα/
∑
β Ziβ .
In this way, Itoˆ’s lemma yields the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks:
dXiα =Xiα
[
(uiα(X)− ui(X))−
(
η2iαXiα −
∑
β
η2iβX
2
iβ
)]
dt
(3.8)
+Xiα
[
ηiα dWiα −
∑
ηiβXiβ dWiβ
]
.
We thus see that the effects of noise propagate differently in the case of
exponential learning and in the case of evolution. Indeed, if we compare
equations (3.5) and (3.8) term by term, we see that the drifts are not quite
the same: even though the payoff adjustment uiα − ui ties both equations
back together in the deterministic setting (η = 0), the two expressions differ
by
Xiα
[
1
2
η2iα −
1
2
∑
β
η2iβXiβ
]
dt.(3.9)
Innocuous as this term might seem, it is actually crucial for the rational-
ity properties of exponential learning in games with randomly perturbed
payoffs. As we shall see in the next sections, it leads to some miraculous
cancellations that allow rationality to emerge in all noise levels.
This difference further suggests that we can pass from (3.5) to (3.8) simply
by modifying the game’s payoffs to u˜iα = uiα+
1
2η
2
iα. Of course, this presumes
that the noise coefficients ηiα be constant—the general case would require
us to allow for games whose payoffs may not be multilinear. This apparent
lack of generality does not really change things but we prefer to keep things
simple and for the time being, it suffices to point out that this modified game
was precisely the one that came up in the analysis of [8, 10]. As a result,
this modification appears to play a pivotal role in setting apart learning
and evolution in a stochastic setting: whereas the modified game is deeply
ingrained in the process of natural selection, exponential learning seems to
give players a clearer picture of the actual underlying game.
4. Extinction of dominated strategies. Thereby armed with the stochas-
tic replicator equations (3.5), (3.5′) to model exponential learning in noisy
environments, the logical next step is to see if the rationality properties of
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the deterministic dynamics carry over to this stochastic setting. In this di-
rection, we will first show that dominated strategies always become extinct
in the long run and that only the rationally admissible ones survive.
As in [4] (implicitly) and [10] (explicitly), the key ingredient of our ap-
proach will be the cross entropy between two mixed strategies qi, xi ∈∆i of
player i ∈N :
H(qi, xi) :=−
∑
α : qiα>0
qiα log(xiα)≡H(qi) + dKL(qi, xi),(4.1)
where H(qi) =−
∑
α qiα log qiα is the entropy of qi and dKL is the intimately
related Kullback–Leibler divergence (or relative entropy):
dKL(qi, xi) :=H(qi, xi)−H(qi) =
∑
α : qiα>0
qiα log
qiα
xiα
.(4.2)
This divergence function is central in the stability analysis of the (deter-
ministic) replicator dynamics because it serves as a distance measure in
probability space [11]. As it stands however, dKL is not a distance function
per se: neither is it symmetric, nor does it satisfy the triangle inequality.
Still, it has the very useful property that dKL(qi, xi)<∞ iff xi employs with
positive probability all pure strategies α ∈ Si that are present in qi [i.e., iff
supp(qi)⊆ supp(xi) or iff qi is absolutely continuous w.r.t. xi]. Therefore, if
dKL(qi, xi) =∞ for all dominated strategies qi of player i, it immediately fol-
lows that xi cannot be dominated itself. In this vein, we have the following.
Proposition 4.1. Let X(t) be a solution of the stochastic replicator
dynamics (3.5) for some interior initial condition X(0) = x ∈ Int(∆). Then,
if qi ∈∆i is (strictly) dominated,
lim
t→∞
dKL(qi,Xi(t)) =∞ almost surely.(4.3)
In particular, if qi = α ∈ Si is pure, we will have limt→∞Xiα(t) = 0 (a.s.):
strictly dominated strategies do not survive in the long run.
Proof. Note first that X(0) = x∈ Int(∆) and hence, Xi(t) will almost
surely stay in Int(∆i) for all t≥ 0; this is a simple consequence of the unique-
ness of strong solutions and the invariance of the faces of ∆i under the
dynamics (3.5).
Let us now consider the cross entropy Gqi(t) between qi and Xi(t):
Gqi(t)≡H(qi,Xi(t)) =−
∑
α
qiα logXiα(t).(4.4)
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As a result of Xi(t) being an interior path, Gqi(t) will remain finite for all
t≥ 0 (a.s.). So, by applying Itoˆ’s lemma we get
dGqi =
∑
β
∂Gqi
∂Xiβ
dXiβ +
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂2Gqi
∂Xiγ ∂Xiβ
dXiβ · dXiγ
(4.5)
=−
∑
β
qiβ
Xiβ
dXiβ +
1
2
∑
β
qiβ
X2iβ
(dXiβ)
2
and, after substituting dXiβ from the dynamics (3.5), this last equation
becomes
dGqi =
∑
β
qiβ
[
ui(X)− uiβ(X) + 1
2
∑
γ
η2iγ(X)Xiγ(1−Xiγ)
]
dt
(4.6)
+
∑
β
qiβ
∑
γ
(Xiγ − δβγ)ηiγ(X)dWiγ .
Accordingly, if q′i ∈∆i is another mixed strategy of player i, we readily
obtain
dGqi − dGq′i = (ui(X−i; q
′
i)− ui(X−i; qi))dt
(4.7)
+
∑
β
(q′iβ − qiβ)ηiβ(X)dWiβ
and, after integrating,
Gqi−q′i(t) =H(qi − q
′
i, x) +
∫ t
0
ui(X−i(s); q
′
i− qi)ds
(4.8)
+
∑
β
(q′iβ − qiβ)
∫ t
0
ηiβ(X(s))dWiβ(s).
Suppose then that qi ≺ q′i and let vi = inf{ui(x−i; q′i− qi) :x−i ∈∆−i}. With
∆−i compact, it easily follows that vi > 0 and the first term of (4.8) will be
bounded from below by vit.
However, since monotonicity fails for Itoˆ integrals, the second term must
be handled with more care. To that end, let ξi(s) =
∑
β(q
′
iβ − qiβ)ηiβ(X(s))
and note that the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality gives
ξ2i (s)≤ Si
∑
β
(q′iβ − qiβ)2η2iβ(X(s))
(4.9)
≤ Siη2i
∑
β
(q′iβ − qiβ)2 ≤ 2Siη2i ,
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where Si = |Si| is the number of pure strategies available to player i and
ηi =max{|ηiβ(x)| :x ∈∆, β ∈ Si}; recall also that qi, q′i ∈∆i for the last step.
Therefore, if ψi(t) =
∑
β(q
′
iβ − qiβ)
∫ t
0 ηiβ(X(s))dWiβ(s) denotes the martin-
gale part of (4.7) and ρi(t) is its quadratic variation, the previous inequality
yields
ρi(t) = [ψi, ψi](t) =
∫ t
0
ξ2i (s)ds≤ 2Siη2i t.(4.10)
Now, if limt→∞ ρi(t) =∞, it follows from the time-change theorem for
martingales (e.g., Theorem 3.4.6 in [12]) that there exists a Wiener process
W˜i such that ψi(t) = W˜i(ρi(t)). Hence, by the law of the iterated logarithm
we get
lim inf
t→∞
Gqi−q′i(t)
≥H(qi − q′i, x) + lim inf
t→∞
(vit+ W˜i(ρi(t)))
≥H(qi − q′i, x) + lim inf
t→∞
(vit−
√
2ρi(t) log log ρi(t))(4.11)
≥H(qi − q′i, x) + lim inf
t→∞
(vit− 2ηi
√
Sit log log(2Siη2i t))
=∞ (almost surely).
On the other hand, if limt→∞ ρi(t)<∞, it is trivial to obtain Gqi−q′i(t)→∞
by letting t→∞ in (4.8). Therefore, with Gqi(t)≥Gqi(t)−Gq′i(t)→∞, we
readily get limt→∞ dKL(qi,Xi(t)) =∞ (a.s.); and since Gα(t) =− logXiα(t)
for all pure strategies α ∈ Si, our proof is complete. 
As in [10], we can now obtain the following estimate for the lifespan of
pure dominated strategies.
Proposition 4.2. Let X(t) be a solution path of (3.5) with initial con-
dition X(0) = x∈ Int(∆) and let Px denote its law. Assume further that the
strategy α ∈ Si is dominated; then, for any M > 0 and for t large enough,
we have
Px{Xiα(t)< e−M} ≥ 1
2
erfc
(
M − hi(xi)− vit
2ηi
√
Sit
)
,(4.12)
where Si = |Si| is the number of strategies available to player i, ηi =
max{|ηiβ(y)| :y ∈∆, β ∈ Si} and the constants vi > 0 and hi(xi) do not de-
pend on t.
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Proof. The proof is pretty straightforward and for the most part fol-
lows [10]. Surely enough, if α≺ pi ∈∆i and we use the same notation as in
the proof of Proposition 4.1, we have
− logXiα(t) =Gα(t)≥Gα(t)−Gpi(t)
≥H(α,x)−H(pi, x) + vit+ W˜i(ρi(t))(4.13)
= hi(xi) + vit+ W˜i(ρi(t)),
where vi := minx−i{ui(x−i;pi) − ui(x−i;α)} > 0 and hi(xi) := logxiα −∑
β piβ logxiβ . Then
Px(Xiα(t)< e
−M )≥ Px{W˜i(ρi(t))>M − hi(xi)− vit}
(4.14)
=
1
2
erfc
(
M − hi(xi)− vit√
2ρi(t)
)
and, since the quadratic variation ρi(t) is bounded above by 2Siη
2
i t (4.10),
the estimate (4.12) holds for all sufficiently large t [i.e., such that M <
hi(xi) + vit]. 
Some remarks are now in order: first and foremost, our results should be
contrasted to those of Cabrales [4] and Imhof [10] where dominated strategies
die out only if the noise coefficients (shocks) ηiα satisfy certain tameness
conditions. The origin of this notable difference is the form of the replicator
equation (3.5) and, in particular, the extra terms that are propagated there
by exponential learning and which are absent from the aggregate shocks
dynamics (3.8). As can be seen from the derivations in Proposition 4.1,
these terms are precisely the ones that allow players to pick up on the true
payoffs uiα instead of the modified ones u˜iα = uiα +
1
2η
2
iα that come up in
[8, 10] (and, indirectly, in [4] as well).
Secondly, it turns out that the way that the noise coefficients ηiβ depend
on the profile x ∈ ∆ is not really crucial: as long as ηiβ(x) is continuous
(or essentially bounded), our arguments are not affected. The only way in
which a specific dependence influences the extinction of dominated strategies
is seen in Proposition 4.2: a sharper estimate of the quadratic variation of∫ t
0 ηiβ(X(s))ds could conceivably yield a more accurate estimate for the
cumulative distribution function of (4.12).
Finally, it is only natural to ask if Proposition 4.1 can be extended to
strategies that are only iteratively dominated. As it turns out, this is indeed
the case.
Theorem 4.3. Let X(t) be a solution path of (3.5) starting at X(0) =
x ∈ Int(∆). Then, if qi ∈∆i is iteratively dominated,
lim
t→∞
dKL(qi,Xi(t)) =∞ almost surely,(4.15)
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that is, only rationally admissible strategies survive in the long run.
Proof. As in the deterministic case [21], the main idea is that the so-
lution path X(t) gets progressively closer to the faces of ∆ that are spanned
by the pure strategies which have not yet been eliminated. Following [4],
we will prove this by induction on the rounds of elimination of dominated
strategies; Proposition 4.1 is simply the case n= 1.
To wit, let Ai ⊆∆i, A−i ⊆∆−i and denote by Adm(Ai,A−i) the set of
strategies qi ∈ Ai that are admissible (i.e., not dominated) with respect to
any strategy q−i ∈A−i. So, if we start with A0i =∆i and A0−i =
∏
j 6=iA0j , we
may define inductively the set of strategies that remain admissible after n
elimination rounds by Ani := Adm(An−1i ,An−1−i ) where An−1i :=
∏
j 6=iAn−1j ;
similarly, the pure strategies that have survived after n such rounds will
be denoted by Sni := Si ∩ Ani . Clearly, this sequence forms a descending
chain A0i ⊇A1i ⊇ · · · and the set A∞i :=
⋂∞
0 Ani will consist precisely of the
strategies of player i that are rationally admissible.
Assume then that the cross entropy Gqi(t) = H(qi,Xi(t)) = −
∑
α qiα ×
logXiα(t) diverges as t→∞ for all strategies qi /∈ Aki that die out within
the first k rounds; in particular, if α /∈ Ski this implies that Xiα(t)→ 0 as
t→∞. We will show that the same is true if qi survives for k rounds but is
eliminated in the subsequent one.
Indeed, if qi ∈Aki but qi /∈Ak+1i , there will exist some q′i ∈Ak+1i such that
ui(x−i; q
′
i)>ui(x−i; qi) for all x−i ∈Ak−i.(4.16)
Now, note that any x−i ∈ ∆−i can be decomposed as x−i = xadm−i + xdom−i
where xadm−i is the “admissible” part of x−i, that is, the projection of x−i
on the subspace spanned by the surviving vertices Sk−i =
∏
j 6=iSki . Hence,
if vi =min{ui(α−i; q′i)− ui(α−i; qi) :α−i ∈ Sk−i}, we will have vi > 0 and, by
linearity,
ui(x
adm
−i ; q
′
i)− ui(xadm−i ; qi)≥ vi > 0 for all x−i ∈∆−i.(4.17)
Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, we also have Xdom−i (t)→ 0 as t→∞.
Thus, there exists some t0 such that
|ui(Xdom−i (t), q′i)− ui(Xdom−i (t), qi)|< vi/2(4.18)
for all t≥ t0 [recall thatXdom−i (t) is spanned by already eliminated strategies].
Therefore, as in the proof of Proposition 4.1, we obtain for t≥ t0
Gqi(t)−Gq′i(t)≥M +
1
2
vit+
∑
β
(q′iβ − qiβ)
∫ t
0
ηiβ(X(s))dWiβ(s),(4.19)
whereM is a constant depending only on t0. In this way, the same reasoning
as before gives limt→∞Gqi(t) =∞ and the theorem follows. 
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As a result, if there exists only one rationally admissible strategy, we get
the following.
Corollary 4.4. Let X(t) be an interior solution path of the replicator
equation (3.5) for some dominance-solvable game G and let x0 ∈ S be the
(unique) strict equilibrium of G. Then
lim
t→∞
X(t) = x0 almost surely,(4.20)
that is, players converge to the game’s strict equilibrium (a.s.).
In concluding this section, it is important to note that all our results on
the extinction of dominated strategies remain true in the adjusted dynamics
(3.5′) as well: this is just a matter of rescaling. The only difference in using
different learning rates λi comes about in Proposition 4.2 where the estimate
(4.12) becomes
Px{Xiα(t)< e−M} ≥ 1
2
erfc
(
M − hi(xi)− λivit
2λiηi
√
Sit
)
.(4.21)
As it stands, this is not a significant difference in itself because the two
estimates are asymptotically equal for large times. Nonetheless, it is this
very lack of contrast that clashes with the deterministic setting where faster
learning rates accelerate the emergence of rationality. The reason for this gap
is that an increased learning rate λi also carries a commensurate increase in
the noise coefficients ηi, and thus deflates the benefits of accentuating payoff
differences. In fact, as we shall see in the next sections, the learning rates do
not really allow players to learn any faster as much as they help diminish
their shortsightedness: by effectively being lazy, it turns out that players are
better able to average out the noise.
5. Congestion games: A suggestive digression. Having established that
irrational choices die out in the long run, we turn now to the question of
whether equilibrial play is stable in the stochastic replicator dynamics of
exponential learning. However, before tackling this issue in complete gen-
erality, it will be quite illustrative to pay a visit to the class of congestion
games where the presence of a potential simplifies things considerably. In
this way, the results we obtain here should be considered as a motivating
precursor to the general case analyzed in Section 6.
5.1. Congestion games. To begin with, it is easy to see that the potential
V of Definition 2.2 is a Lyapunov function for the deterministic replicator
dynamics. Indeed, assume that player i ∈N is learning at a rate λi > 0 and
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let x(t) be a solution path of the rate-adjusted dynamics (2.11). Then, a
simple differentiation of V (x(t)) gives
dV
dt
=
∑
i,α
∂V
∂xiα
dxiα
dt
=−
∑
i,α
uiα(x)λixiα(uiα(x)− ui(x))
(5.1)
=−
∑
i
λi
(∑
α
xiαu
2
iα(x)− u2i (x)
)
≤ 0,
the last step following from Jensen’s inequality—recall that ∂V
∂xiα
=−uiα(x)
on account of (2.5) and also that ui(x) =
∑
α xiαuiα(x). In particular, this
implies that the trajectories x(t) are attracted to the local minima of V ,
and since these minima coincide with the strict equilibria of the game, we
painlessly infer that strict equilibrial play is asymptotically stable in (2.11)—
as mentioned before, we plead guilty to a slight abuse of terminology in
assuming that all equilibria in pure strategies are also strict.
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether similar conclusions can be drawn
in the noisy setting of (3.5′). Mirroring the deterministic case, a promising
way to go about this question is to consider again the potential function V
of the game and try to show that it is stochastically Lyapunov in the sense
of Definition 2.4. Indeed, if q0 = (e1,0, . . . , eN,0) ∈∆ is a local minimum of
V (and hence, a strict equilibrium of the underlying game), we may assume
without loss of generality that V (q0) = 0 so that V (x)> 0 in a neighborhood
of q0. We are thus left to examine the negativity condition of Definition 2.4,
that is, whether there exists some k > 0 such that LV (x)≤−kV (x) for all
x sufficiently close to q0.
To that end, recall that ∂V
∂xiα
=−uiα and that ∂2V∂x2iα = 0. Then, the gener-
ator L of the rate-adjusted dynamics (3.5′) applied to V produces
LV (x) =−
∑
i,α
λixiαuiα(x)(uiα(x)− ui(x))
(5.2)
−
∑
i,α
λ2i
2
xiαuiα(x)
(
η2iα(1− 2xiα)−
∑
β
η2iβxiβ(1− 2xiβ)
)
,
where, for simplicity, we have assumed that the noise coefficients ηiα are
constant.
We will study (5.2) term by term by considering the perturbed strategies
xi = (1− εi)ei,0 + εiyi where yi belongs to the face of ∆i that lies opposite
to ei,0 (i.e., yiµ ≥ 0, µ = 1,2, . . . and
∑
µ yiµ = 1) and εi > 0 measures the
distance of player i from ei,0. In this way, we get
ui(x) =
∑
α
xiαuiα(x) = (1− εi)ui,0(x) + εi
∑
µ
yiµuiµ(x)
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= ui,0(x) + εi
∑
µ
yiµ[uiµ(x)− ui,0(x)](5.3)
= ui,0(x)− εi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ +O(ε2i ),
where ∆uiµ = ui,0(q0)−uiµ(q0)> 0. Then, by going back to (5.2), we obtain∑
α
xiαuiα(x)[uiα(x)− ui(x)]
= (1− εi)ui,0(x)[ui,0(x)− ui(x)]
+ εi
∑
µ
yiµuiµ(x)[uiµ(x)− ui(x)]
= (1− εi)ui,0(x) · εi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ(5.4)
− εi
∑
µ
yiµuiµ(q0)∆uiµ +O(ε2i )
= εi
∑
µ
yiµui,0(q0)∆uiµ − εi
∑
µ
yiµuiµ(q0)∆uiµ +O(ε2i )
= εi
∑
µ
yiµ(∆uiµ)
2 +O(ε2i ).
As for the second term of (5.2), some easy algebra reveals that
η2i,0(1− 2xi,0)−
∑
β
η2iβxiβ(1− 2xiβ)
=−η2i,0(1− 2εi)− η2i,0(1− εi)− εi
∑
µ
η2iµyiµ
(5.5)
+ 2(1− εi)2η2i,0 +2ε2i
∑
µ
η2iµy
2
iµ
=−εi
(
η2i,0 +
∑
µ
yiµη
2
iµ
)
+O(ε2i )
and, after a (somewhat painful) series of calculations, we get∑
α
xiαuiα(x)
(
η2iα(1− 2xiα)−
∑
β
η2iβxiβ(1− 2xiβ)
)
= (1− εi)ui,0(x)
(
η2i,0(1− 2xi,0)−
∑
β
η2iβxiβ(1− 2xiβ)
)
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+ εi
∑
µ
yiµ
(
η2iµ(1− 2xiµ)−
∑
β
η2iβxiβ(1− 2xiβ)
)
(5.6)
=−εiui,0(q0)
(
η2i,0+
∑
µ
yiµη
2
iµ
)
+ εi
∑
µ
yiµuiµ(q0)(η
2
iµ + η
2
i,0) +O(ε2i )
=−εi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ(η
2
iµ + η
2
i,0) +O(ε2i ).
Finally, if we assume without loss of generality that V (q0) = 0 and set ξ =
x− q0 (i.e., ξi,0 =−εi and ξiµ = εiyiµ for all i ∈N , µ ∈ Si \ {0}), we readily
get
V (x) =
∑
i,α
∂V
∂xiα
ξiα +O(ξ2)
=−
∑
i,α
∂ui
∂xiα
∣∣∣∣
q0
ξiα +O(ε2)
(5.7)
=−
∑
i,α
uiα(q0)ξiα +O(ε2)
=
∑
i
εi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ +O(ε2),
where ε2 =
∑
i ε
2
i . Therefore, by combining (5.4), (5.6) and (5.7), the nega-
tivity condition LV (x)≤−kV (x) becomes
∑
i
λiεi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ
[
∆uiµ − λi
2
(η2iµ + η
2
i,0)
]
(5.8)
≥ k
∑
i
εi
∑
µ
yiµ∆uiµ +O(ε2).
Hence, if ∆uiµ >
λi
2 (η
2
iµ+ η
2
i,0) for all µ ∈ Si \{0}, this last inequality will be
satisfied for some k > 0 whenever ε is small enough. Essentially, this proves
the following.
Proposition 5.1. Let q = (α1, . . . , αN ) be a strict equilibrium of a con-
gestion game G with potential function V and assume that V (q) = 0. As-
sume further that the learning rates λi are sufficiently small so that, for all
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µ ∈ Si \ {αi} and all i ∈N ,
V (q−i, µ)>
λi
2
(η2iµ + η
2
i,0).(5.9)
Then q is stochastically asymptotically stable in the rate-adjusted dynamics
(3.5′).
We thus see that no matter how loud the noise ηi might be, stochastic
stability is always guaranteed if the players choose a learning rate that is
slow enough as to allow them to average out the noise (i.e., λi <∆Vi/η
2
i ). Of
course, it can be argued here that it is highly unrealistic to expect players
to be able to estimate the amount of Nature’s interference and choose a
suitably small rate λi. On top of that, the very form of the condition (5.9)
is strongly reminiscent of the “modified” game of [8, 10], a similarity which
seems to contradict our statement that exponential learning favors rational
reactions in the original game. The catch here is that condition (5.9) is
only sufficient and Proposition 5.1 merely highlights the role of a potential
function in a stochastic environment. As we shall see in Section 6, nothing
stands in the way of choosing a different Lyapunov candidate and dropping
requirement (5.9) altogether.
5.2. The dyadic case. To gain some further intuition into why the con-
dition (5.9) is redundant, it will be particularly helpful to examine the case
where players compete for the resources of only two facilities (i.e., Si = {0,1}
for all i ∈N ) and try to learn the game with the help of the uniform repli-
cator equation (3.5). This is the natural setting for the El Farol bar problem
[2] and the ensuing minority game [14] where players choose to “buy” or
“sell” and are rewarded when they are in the minority–buyers in a sellers’
market or sellers in an abundance of buyers.
As has been shown in [17], such games always possess strict equilibria,
even when players have distinct payoff functions. So, by relabeling indices if
necessary, let us assume that q0 = (e1,0, . . . , eN,0) is such a strict equilibrium
and set xi ≡ xi,0. Then, the generator of the replicator equation (3.5) takes
the form
L=
∑
i
xi(1− xi)
[
∆ui(x) +
1
2
(1− 2xi)η2i (x)
]
∂
∂xi
(5.10)
+
1
2
∑
i
x2i (1− xi)2η2i (x)
∂2
∂x2i
,
where now ∆ui ≡ ui,0 − ui,1 and η2i = η2i,0 + η2i,1.
It thus appears particularly appealing to introduce a new set of variables
yi such that
∂
∂yi
= xi(1−xi) ∂∂xi ; this is just the “logit” transformation: yi =
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logitxi ≡ log xi1−xi . In these new variables, (5.10) assumes the astoundingly
suggestive guise
L=
∑
i
(
∆ui
∂
∂yi
+
1
2
η2i
∂2
∂y2i
)
,(5.11)
which reveals that the noise coefficients can be effectively decoupled from
the payoffs. We can then take advantage of this by letting L act on the
function f(y) =
∑
i e
−aiyi (ai > 0):
Lf(y) =−
∑
i
ai
(
∆ui− 1
2
aiη
2
i
)
e−aiyi .(5.12)
Hence, if ai is chosen small enough so that ∆ui − 12aiη2i ≥ mi > 0 for all
sufficiently large yi [recall that ∆ui(q0)> 0 since q0 is a strict equilibrium],
we get
Lf(y)≤−
∑
i
aimie
−aiyi ≤−kf(y),(5.13)
where k =mini{aimi}> 0. And since f is strictly positive for yi,0 > 0 and
only vanishes as y→∞ (i.e., at the equilbrium q0), a trivial modification of
the stochastic Lyapunov method (see, e.g., pages 314 and 315 of [7]) yields
the following.
Proposition 5.2. The strict equilibria of minority games are stochas-
tically asymptotically stable in the uniform replicator equation (3.5).
Remark 5.3. It is trivial to see that strict equilibria of minority games
will also be stable in the rate-adjusted dynamics (3.5′): in that case we
simply need to choose ai such that ∆ui − 12aiλiη2i ≥mi > 0.
Remark 5.4. A closer inspection of the calculations leading to Propo-
sition 5.2 reveals that nothing hinges on the minority mechanism per se: it
is (5.11) that is crucial to our analysis and L takes this form whenever the
underlying game is a dyadic one (i.e., |Si|= 2 for all i ∈N ). In other words,
Proposition 5.2 also holds for all games with 2 strategies and should thus be
seen as a significant extension of Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.5. The strict equilibria of dyadic games are stochasti-
cally asym ptotically stable in the replicator dynamics (3.5), (3.5′) of expo-
nential learning.
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6. Stability of equilibrial play. In deterministic environments, the “folk
theorem” of evolutionary game theory provides some pretty strong ties be-
tween equilibrial play and stability: strict equilibria are asymptotically stable
in the multi-population replicator dynamics (2.9) [11]. In our stochastic set-
ting, we have already seen that this is always true in two important classes
of games: those that can be solved by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies (Corollary 4.4) and dyadic ones (Proposition 5.5).
Although interesting in themselves, these results clearly fall short of adding
up to a decent analogue of the folk theorem for stochastically perturbed
games. Nevertheless, they are quite strong omens in that direction and such
expectations are vindicated in the following.
Theorem 6.1. The strict equilibria of a game G are stochastically asymp-
totically stable in the replicator dynamics (3.5), (3.5′) of exponential learn-
ing.
Before proving Theorem 6.1, we should first take a slight detour in order
to properly highlight some of the issues at hand. On that account, assume
again that the profile q0 = (e1,0, . . . , eN,0) is a strict equilibrium of G. Then,
if q0 is to be stochastically stable, say in the uniform dynamics (3.5), one
would expect the strategy scores Ui,0 of player i to grow much faster than the
scores Uiµ, µ ∈ Si \ {0} of his other strategies. This is captured remarkably
well by the “adjusted” scores
Zi,0 = λiUi,0 − log
(∑
µ
eλiUiµ
)
,(6.1a)
Ziµ = λi(Uiµ −Ui,0),(6.1b)
where λi > 0 is a sensitivity parameter akin (but not identical) to the learn-
ing rates of (3.5′) (the choice of common notation is fairly premeditated
though).
Clearly, whenever Zi,0 is large, Ui,0 will be much greater than any other
score Uiµ and hence, the strategy 0 ∈ Si will be employed by player i far more
often. To see this in more detail, it is convenient to introduce the variables
Yi,0 := e
Zi,0 =
eλiUi,0∑
ν e
λiUiν
,(6.2a)
Yiµ :=
eZiµ∑
ν e
Ziν
=
eλiUiµ∑
ν e
λiUiν
,(6.2b)
where Yi,0 is a measure of how close Xi is to ei,0 ∈∆i and (Yi,1, Yi,2, . . .) ∈
∆Si−1 is a direction indicator; the two sets of coordinates are then related by
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the transformation Yiα =X
λi
iα/
∑
µX
λi
iµ , α ∈ Si, µ ∈ Si\{0}. Consequently, to
show that the strict equilibrium q0 = (e1,0, . . . , eN,0) is stochastically asymp-
totically stable in the replicator equation (3.5), it will suffice to show that
Yi,0 diverges to infinity as t→∞ with arbitrarily high probability.
Our first step in this direction will be to derive an SDE for the evolution
of the Yiα processes. To that end, Itoˆ’s lemma gives
dYiα =
∑
j,β
∂Yiα
∂Ujβ
dUjβ +
1
2
∑
j,k
∑
β,γ
∂2Yiα
∂Ujβ ∂Ukγ
dUjβ · dUkγ
(6.3)
=
∑
β
(
uiβ
∂Yiα
∂Uiβ
+
1
2
η2iβ
∂2Yiα
∂U2iβ
)
dt+
∑
β
ηiβ
∂Yiα
∂Uiβ
dWiβ,
where, after a simple differentiation of (6.2a), we have
∂Yi,0
∂Ui,0
= λiYi,0,
∂2Yi,0
∂U2i,0
= λ2iYi,0,
(6.4a)
∂Yi,0
∂Uiν
=−λiYi,0Yiν , ∂
2Yi,0
∂U2iν
=−λ2iYi,0Yiν(1− 2Yiν)(6.4a′)
and, similarly, from (6.2b)
∂Yiµ
∂Ui,0
= 0,
∂2Yiµ
∂U2i,0
= 0,
(6.4b)
∂Yiµ
∂Uiν
= λiYiµ(δµν − Yiν),
(6.4b′)
∂2Yiµ
∂U2iν
= λ2i Yiµ(δµν − Yiν)(1− 2Yiν).
In this way, by plugging everything back into (6.3) we finally obtain
dYi,0 = λiYi,0
[
ui,0−
∑
µ
Yiµuiµ +
λi
2
η2i,0 −
λi
2
∑
µ
Yiµ(1− 2Yiµ)η2iµ
]
dt
(6.5a)
+ λiYi,0
[
ηi,0 dWi,0 −
∑
µ
ηiµYiµ dWiµ
]
,
dYiµ = λiYiµ[uiµ −
∑
ν
uiνYiν ]dt
+
λ2i
2
Yiµ
[
η2iµ(1− 2Yiµ)−
∑
ν
η2iνYiν(1− 2Yiν)
]
dt(6.5b)
+ λiYiµ
[
ηiµ dWiµ −
∑
ν
ηiνYiν dWiν
]
,
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where we have suppressed the arguments of ui and ηi in order to reduce
notational clutter.
This last SDE is particularly revealing: roughly speaking, we see that
if λi is chosen small enough, the deterministic term ui,0 −
∑
µ Yiµuiµ will
dominate the rest (cf. with the “soft” learning rates of Proposition 5.1).
And, since we know that strict equilibria are asymptotically stable in the
deterministic case, it is plausible to expect the SDE (6.5) to behave in a
similar fashion.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Tying in with our previous discussion, we will
establish stochastic asymptotic stability of strict equilibria in the dynamics
(3.5) by looking at the processes Yi = (Yi,0, Yi,1, . . .) ∈R×∆Si−1 of (6.2). In
these coordinates, we just need to show that for every Mi > 0, i ∈N and any
ε > 0, there exist Qi >Mi such that if Yi,0(0) >Qi, then, with probability
greater than 1− ε, limt→∞ Yi,0(t) =∞ and Yi,0(t)>Mi for all t≥ 0. In the
spirit of the previous section, we will accomplish this with the help of the
stochastic Lyapunov method.
Our first task will be to calculate the generator of the diffusion Y =
(Y1, . . . , YN ), that is, the second order differential operator
L=
∑
i∈N
α∈Si
biα(y)
∂
∂yiα
+
1
2
∑
i∈N
α,β∈Si
(σi(y)σ
T
i (y))αβ
∂2
∂yiα ∂yiβ
,(6.6)
where bi and σi are the drift and diffusion coefficients of the SDE (6.5),
respectively. In particular, if we restrict our attention to sufficiently smooth
functions of the form f(y) =
∑
i∈N fi(yi,0), the application of L yields
Lf(y) =
∑
i∈N
λiyi,0
[
ui,0 +
λi
2
η2i,0
−
∑
µ
yiµ
(
uiµ − λi
2
(1− 2yiµ)η2iµ
)]
∂fi
∂yi,0
(6.7)
+
1
2
∑
i∈N
λ2i y
2
i,0
[
η2i,0+
∑
µ
η2iµy
2
iµ
]
∂2fi
∂2yi,0
.
Therefore, let us consider the function f(y) =
∑
i 1/yi,0 for yi,0 > 0. With
∂f
∂yi,0
=−1/y2i,0 and ∂
2f
∂y2i,0
= 2/y3i,0, (6.7) becomes
Lf(y) =−
∑
i∈N
λi
yi,0
[
ui,0 −
∑
µ
uiµyiµ − λi
2
η2i,0
(6.8)
− λi
2
∑
µ
yiµ(1− yiµ)η2iµ
]
.
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However, since q0 = (e1,0, . . . , eN,0) has been assumed to be a strict Nash
equilibrium of G, we will have ui,0(q0)>uiµ(q0) for all µ ∈ Si \{0}. Then, by
continuity, there exists some positive constant vi > 0 with ui,0−
∑
µ uiµyiµ ≥
vi > 0 whenever yi,0 is large enough (recall that
∑
µ yiµ = 1). So, if we set
ηi = max{|ηiβ(x)| :x ∈ ∆, β ∈ Si} and pick positive λi with λi < vi/η2i , we
get
Lf(y)≤−
∑
i∈N
λivi
2
1
yi,0
≤−1
2
min
i
{λivi}f(y)(6.9)
for all sufficiently large yi,0. Moreover, f is strictly positive for yi,0 > 0 and
vanishes only as yi,0 →∞. Hence, as in the proof of Proposition 5.2, our
claim follows on account of f being a (local) stochastic Lyapunov function.
Finally, in the case of the rate-adjusted replicator dynamics (3.5′), the
proof is similar and only entails a rescaling of the parameters λi. 
Remark 6.2. If we trace our steps back to the coordinates Xiα, our
Lyapunov candidate takes the form f(x) =
∑
i(x
−λi
i,0
∑
µ x
λi
iµ). It thus begs
to be compared to the Lyapunov function
∑
µ x
λ
µ employed by Imhof and
Hofbauer in [8] to derive a conditional version of Theorem 6.1 in the evo-
lutionary setting. As it turns out, the obvious extension f(x) =
∑
i
∑
µ x
λi
iµ
works in our case as well, but the calculations are much more cumbersome
and they are also shorn of their ties to the adjusted scores (6.1).
Remark 6.3. We should not neglect to highlight the dual role that the
learning rates λi play in our analysis. In the logistic learning model (2.10),
they measure the players’ convictions and how strongly they react to a given
stimulus (the scores Uiα); in this role, they are fixed at the outset of the game
and form an intrinsic part of the replicator dynamics (3.5′). On the other
hand, they also make a virtual appearance as free temperature parameters
in the adjusted scores (6.1), to be softened until we get the desired result.
For this reason, even though Theorem 6.1 remains true for any choice of
learning rates, the function f(x) =
∑
i x
−λi
i,0
∑
µ x
λi
iµ is Lyapunov only if the
sensitivity parameters λi are small enough. It might thus seem unfortunate
that we chose the same notation in both cases, but we feel that our decision
is justified by the intimate relation of the two parameters.
7. Discussion. Our aim in this last section will be to discuss a number
of important issues that we have not been able to address thoroughly in the
rest of the paper; truth be told, a good part of this discussion can be seen
as a roadmap for future research.
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Ties with evolutionary game theory. In single-population evolutionary
models, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy which is robust
against invasion by mutant phenotypes [15]. Strategies of this kind can be
considered as a stepping stone between mixed and strict equilibria and they
are of such significance that it makes one wonder why they have not been
included in our analysis.
The reason for this omission is pretty simple: even the weakest evolution-
ary criteria in multi-population models tend to reject all strategies which
are not strict Nash equilibria [11]. Therefore, since our learning model (2.9)
corresponds exactly to the multi-population environment (2.14), we lose
nothing by concentrating our analysis only on the strict equilibria of the
game. If anything, this equivalence between ESS and strict equilibria in
multi-population settings further highlights the importance of the latter.
However, this also brings out the gulf between the single-population set-
ting and our own, even when we restrict ourselves to 2-player games (which
are the norm in single-population models). Indeed, the single-population
version of the dynamics (3.8) is:
dXα =Xα
[
(uα(X)− u(X,X))−
(
η2αXα −
∑
β
η2βX
2
β
)]
dt
(7.1)
+Xα
[
ηα dWα −
∑
ηβXβ dWβ
]
.
As it turns out, if a game possesses an interior ESS and the shocks are
mild enough, the solution paths X(t) of the (single-population) replicator
dynamics will be recurrent (Theorem 2.1 in [10]). Theorem 6.1 rules out
such behavior in the case of strict equilibria (the multi-population analogue
of ESS), but does not answer the following question: if the underlying game
only has mixed equilibria, will the solution X(t) of the dynamics (3.5) be
recurrent?
This question is equivalent to showing that a profile x is stochastically
asymptotically stable in the replicator equations (3.5), (3.5′) only if it is a
strict equilibrium. Since Theorem 6.1 provides the converse “if” part, an an-
swer in the positive would yield a strong equivalence between stochastically
stable states and strict equilibria; we leave this direction to be explored in
future papers.
Itoˆ vs. Stratonovich. For comparison purposes (but also for simplicity),
let us momentarily assume that the noise coefficients ηiα do not depend on
the state X(t) of the game. In that case, it is interesting (and very instruc-
tive) to note that the SDE (3.1) remains unchanged if we use Stratonovich
integrals instead of Itoˆ ones:
dUiα(t) = uiα(X(t))dt+ ηiα ∂Wiα(t).(7.2)
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Then, after a few calculations, the corresponding replicator equation reads
∂Xiα =Xiα(uiα(X)− ui(X))dt+Xiα
(
ηiα ∂Wiα −
∑
ηiβXiβ ∂Wiβ
)
.(7.3)
The form of this last equation is remarkably suggestive. First, it high-
lights the role of the modified game u˜iα = uiα+
1
2η
2
iα even more crisply than
(3.5): the payoff terms are completely decoupled from the noise, in contrast
to what one obtains by introducing Stratonovich perturbations in the evolu-
tionary setting [8, 13]. Secondly, one can seemingly use this simpler equation
to get a much more transparent proof of Proposition 4.1: the estimates for
the cross entropy terms Gqi−q′i are recovered almost immediately from the
Stratonovich dynamics. However, since (7.3) takes this form only for con-
stant coefficients ηiα (the general case is quite a bit uglier), we chose the
route of consistency and employed Itoˆ integrals throughout our paper.
Applications in network design. Before closing, it is worth pointing out
the applicability of the above approach to networks where the presence of
noise or uncertainty has two general sources. The first of these has to do with
the time variability of the connections which may be due to the fluctuations
of the link quality because of mobility in the wireless case or because of
external factors (e.g., load conditions) in wireline networks. This variability
is usually dependent on the state of the network and was our original moti-
vation in considering noise coefficients ηiα that are functions of the players’
strategy profile; incidentally, it was also our original motivation for consid-
ering randomly fluctuating payoffs in the first place: travel times and delays
in traffic models are not determined solely by the players’ choices, but also
by the fickle interference of nature.
The second source stems from errors in the measurement of the payoffs
themselves (e.g., the throughput obtained in a particular link) and also from
the lack of information on the payoff of strategies that were not employed.
The variability of the noise coefficients ηiα again allows for a reasonable ap-
proximation to this problem. Indeed, if ηiα :∆→R is continuous and satisfies
ηiα(x−i;α) = 0 for all i ∈N , α ∈ Si, this means that there are only errors in
estimating the payoffs of strategies that were not employed (or small er-
rors for pure strategies that are employed with high probability). Of course,
this does not yet give the full picture [one should consider the discrete-time
dynamical system (2.6) instead where the players’ actual choices are consid-
ered], but we conjecture that our results will remain essentially unaltered.
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Some of the results of Section 4 were presented in the conference “Game
Theory for Networks” in Bog˘azic¸i University, Istanbul, May 2009 [16].
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